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Abstract 
This paper shows that foreign aid in postwar Lebanon passed through two phases with 
distinct features that have had far reaching implications for postwar development. In the 
first phase lasting from 1992-97, foreign aid was mainly channelled towards providing 
resources for postwar reconstruction projects. The second phase from 1997 to the 
present witnessed a qualitative shift in foreign aid utilization from reconstruction needs 
towards financial stability and balance-of-payments equilibrium needs. This shift 
allowed the government to intervene in the foreign exchange market, maintained 
balance of payments surpluses during this period, reduced interest rates on public debt 
instruments and finally provided the necessary liquidity and ‘confidence’ for the 
government to continue borrowing funds from local commercial banks and foreign 
investors. More importantly this shift in foreign aid allowed the government to avoid 
financial and currency crises in 2002. However, the cost of such a qualitative shift was 
large in terms of fiscal management, diversion of funds from reconstruction, and the 
increased dependency of the Lebanese economy on foreign aid for stabilization 
purposes. 
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1 Introduction 
Lebanon experienced a civil war that lasted for more than 15 years from 1975 to 1990. 
The duration and severity of the war led to a huge devastation of the physical, human 
and social capitals. A review of the physical and human losses—such as lost output 
estimated at US$24 billion in 1986; reduction in GDP per capita by around 67 per cent; 
131,000 war deaths, and the emigration of 500,000 inhabitants, mainly high-skilled 
workers—points to the huge challenges that were confronted in the immediate postwar 
period of economic reconstruction (Dibeh 2005). In this respect, foreign aid was 
considered an important element of the postwar reconstruction process. The national 
reconstruction programmes implemented in the post-1992 period included substantial 
foreign aid and loans component that were deemed necessary for resource provision for 
the ambitious programmes. However, Lebanon’s reconstruction challenges proved to be 
daunting and these spanned the often conflicting needs of reconstruction, fiscal 
management and financial stability. The early promises of vast amounts of foreign aid, 
mainly from Arab sources after the signing of the Taif Peace Accords in Saudi Arabia in 
1989, did not materialize as the early postwar governments had hoped. The Syrian 
hegemony over Lebanese political affairs in the post-Taif period led the United States, 
France and Arab countries to refrain from the provision of funds for reconstruction as 
promised. Hence, the Lebanese government decided in 1992 to follow a two-pronged 
approach to reconstruction: utilization of foreign funds for immediate reconstruction 
projects and reliance on internal funding for deficit-financing and exchange rate 
stabilization. Lebanon’s main source of internal funding was the well-developed 
commercial banking system.1 Traditionally the commercial banking sector has been the 
strongest sector in the economy before the war when Lebanon was considered a major 
regional financial centre. The banking system in the immediate postwar period was able 
to attract capital inflows from foreign sources and from the large pool of Lebanese 
immigrants whose remittances have traditionally supplied the country with a large share 
of its foreign currency needs. This postwar open economy approach helped Lebanon 
revolve its financing difficulties stemming from the lack of national savings and 
adequate foreign aid (Gressani and Page 1999).  
The complexity of the Lebanese experience in relying on foreign aid both for 
reconstruction and development and for fiscal balance and financial stability—coupled 
with internal funding mechanisms—makes Lebanon an important case study of the 
relationship between foreign aid and postwar development priorities. In addition, the 
study of the effect of foreign aid on the postwar Lebanese economy takes on a new 
urgency as Lebanon prepares to receive a new wave of foreign aid estimated at around 
US$7.6 billion pledged by international donors during the Paris III Conference in 
January 2007. This conference came at the heels of the most radical political 
developments in Lebanon in the past two decades. The assassination in February 2005 
of the late prime minister, Rafic Hariri, the symbol of postwar reconstruction, led to 
massive protests, resulting in the withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005 that had 
been present in the country since 1976 and had been the main enforcer of the Taif 
Accords that ended the civil war in 1990. New elections were held in May and June 
2005, bringing an anti-Syrian majority into parliament and government. The new reform 
programme prepared for the Paris III Conference, promised significant economic and 
                                                 
1  The importance of the role of the banking system in providing funds for reconstruction and the private 
sector in postconflict societies is discussed in Addison et al. (2001). 
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structural reforms including privatization, tax increases, labour law reform and reforms 
to the social security system. 
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 delineates the different types and phases of 
foreign aid in Lebanon. Section 3 concentrates on the study of the early sources of 
funding that were geared specifically for the reconstruction phase 1992-97. Section 4 
briefly discusses macroeconomic developments during the postwar era up to the period 
preceding the international donors conference held in November 2002, known as 
Paris II. Section 5 discusses the Paris II meeting and its fiscal and economic effects, 
while section 6 concludes. 
2 Forms of foreign aid in the postwar period 
It is rather paradoxical that Lebanon, currently in its 16th year after the official end of 
hostilities, is still in need of foreign assistance on a massive scale (even more so than 
before). This is a long time, given that the lifecycle of foreign aid in postwar 
reconstruction programmes is in the order of few years (Kang and Meernik 2004). 
Although Lebanon is beyond the reconstruction phase, this chronic need for continuous 
foreign aid was the result of the failures of the economic policies conducted in the 
immediate era of the postwar reconstruction phase (for details see Dibeh 2005). These 
developments attest to the fact that Lebanon failed in its postwar reconstruction effort to 
develop a ‘self-sustaining order’, a prerequisite for the success of postwar 
reconstruction (Coyne 2005). In this respect, foreign aid in postwar Lebanon passed 
through two phases with distinct features. The first phase, lasting from 1992 to 1997, 
can be dubbed as a ‘classical phase’ when funds were channelled towards providing 
resources for the reconstruction projects envisioned in the various postwar 
reconstruction programmes (Helbling 1999). Foreign aid was aimed at financing the 
massive infrastructure rebuilding in the areas of electricity, water, and telephone and 
road networks. Most of this foreign aid was channelled through the Council of 
Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the government agency established in 1981 
amidst the civil war. However, a small share of the reconstruction needs were financed 
through foreign grants compared to foreign loans, even though official development aid 
per capita (ODA) in postwar Lebanon was high in comparison to ODA in the post-
conflict low-income states in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The second phase, which spans the period from 1997 to the present, witnessed a 
qualitative shift in foreign aid utilization from the demands of reconstruction towards 
needs for financial stability and balance-of-payments equilibrium. Foreign aid geared 
towards reconstruction dwindled from the 1997 budget onwards while foreign aid in the 
form of foreign exchange reserve deposits with the central bank and foreign currency 
grants and soft loans increased tremendously. One type of foreign aid was aimed at 
propping up the Lebanese balance of payments and the central bank foreign exchange 
reserves through direct deposits with the central bank. This type of aid was intermittent 
and sparse, but came at crucial times when the Lebanese currency, stabilized in the 
postwar period, was under severe pressure resulting from economic and political 
developments. The foreign aid came mainly from countries within the region, such as 
Saudi Arabia. This shift in the purpose of foreign aid was codified with the Friends of 
Lebanon Conference held in Washington in 1997 and continued with the Paris II 
meetings held in late 2002. The new phase of foreign aid enabled the government to 
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achieve several objectives. First, the central bank was able to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to defend the currency given the inflow of foreign capital. Second, 
Lebanon was able to maintain balance-of-payments surpluses during this period. Third, 
capital inflows led to a reduction in interest rates on public debt instruments and finally 
provided the necessary liquidity and ‘confidence’ for the government to continue 
borrowing funds from local commercial banks and foreign sources. Overall, this shift in 
foreign aid allowed the government to sidestep financial and currency crises, 
particularly as a result of the Paris II meetings when approximately US$2.4 billion was 
received in the form of soft loans for debt restructuring. In the post-Paris II meetings 
period, interest rates on the both dollar and Lebanese pound denominated debt 
instruments plummeted, commercial bank liquidity soared and balance of payments 
went into surplus.  
3 Foreign aid for reconstruction 
Foreign aid and postwar reconstruction have been closely linked since the 
implementation of the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of Europe in the post-Second 
World War period. In more recent times, foreign assistance has been instrumental in 
providing the necessary resources for postwar reconstruction in many war-torn 
countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and west African states. In many 
instances, foreign aid was the only source of funds for reconstruction; in Sierra Leone, 
for example, post-conflict reconstruction was funded by foreign sources such as the UN, 
UK and foreign NGOs. The scale of foreign aid to GDP and to reconstruction needs has 
been staggering (Grant 2005). Kosovo is totally dependent on foreign aid for 
reconstruction and for current expenditures on the day-to-day running of the affairs of 
the province in many areas such as education, energy and security.  
The Lebanese government, through the Council for Development and Reconstruction 
(CDR), its principal reconstruction arm, vigorously implemented an infrastructure 
reconstruction programme in the post-1992 period. The emphasis on infrastructure 
development was a reflection of the severe damage and destruction that the 
infrastructure in all its variations—physical, basic services and otherwise—had suffered 
during the long civil war as a result of direct destruction or years of neglect and lack of 
maintenance. In these situations, such an emphasis on infrastructure is highly justified 
(Anand 2005). The main reconstruction projects were envisioned in the Horizon 2000 
Plan that went through different forms during 1992-95. Public investments, totalling 
US$17.7 billion, were to be allocated to physical infrastructure, social infrastructure and 
public services. As of December 1997, foreign financing of the 1992 reconstruction 
programme totalled US$4.0 billion, with US$3.5 billion in loans and US$0.5 billion in 
grants with the loans component consisting of soft loans and commercial loans with 
export guarantees (Wetter 1999). Table 1 shows that during this period foreign aid in 
the form of soft and concessionary loans and grants awarded to the government formed 
a significant share of total public capital expenditures. Table 2 shows the extent of 
foreign financing of reconstruction needs during the periods 1992-97 and 1998-2004. 
After this period, foreign loans and grants for reconstruction were greatly reduced. The 
reconstruction phase of postwar development was nearing its end. By the end of 2004, 
the total amount of foreign financing, including all types of loans and grants, was 
around US$5.8 billion. The temporal allocation shows that around 70 per cent of foreign 
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financing was allocated during the 1992-97 period compared to only 30 per cent during 
1998-2004 (see Table 2).  
The source of funding for reconstruction was overwhelmingly from international 
institutions, Arab Gulf countries and institutions, France and Italy. Table 3 shows the 
distribution of source of funding from major donors. 
Table 1 
Foreign loan, grants and public investments as shares of GDP, 1992-97 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
       
Grants/GDP, % 0.0 1.5 3.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Foreign loans/GDP, % -1.1 2.6 7.8 4.9 4.2 3.5 
Public capital expenditure/GDP, % 1.5 3.4 9.3 9.4 8.5 8.6 
Source: Helbling (1999). 
 
Table 2 
Foreign aid and reconstruction expenditures, 1992-2004 
 1992-97 1998-2004 
   
Reconstruction expenditures (US$ billion) 4.2 7.4 
Foreign aid (US$ billion) 4.0 5.85 
Ratio, % 95.0 79.0 
Source: Wetter (1999) for the period 1992-97; CDR (2005) for the period 1992-2004.  
Table 3 
 Main sources of funding for Lebanon’s reconstruction, 1992-97 and 1992-2004 
Source 1992-97 (%) 1992-2004 (%) 
   
World Bank 15.0 14.0 
Arab Fund 12.6 13.0 
European Investment Bank 12.5 14.0 
Saudi Arabia + Saudi Fund 9.7 7.0 
Italy 8.5 6.0 
Kuwait + Kuwaiti Fund 6.8 10.0 
France 6.8 6.0 
Source: Wetter (1999) for the period 1992-97; CDR (2005) for the period 1992-2004.  
Table 4 
Planned and realized public investments in various sectors, 1992-2004 
Type of investment 
Horizon 2000 
1993-97 
Achieved 
1992-97 % 
Achieved 
1992-2004 
%  of  
Horizon 2000
      
Physical (US$ million) 3,200 2,206 69  3,431 107  
Social 1,930 553 29  970 50  
Public services 980 615 63  1,856 190  
Productive and others 1,236 778 63  1,145 93  
Source:  Calculations by author from Wetter (1999) and CDR (2005).  
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The originally planned public expenditures targets were not met although the 
reconstruction programme itself was successful in restoring the main physical 
infrastructure such as electricity, roads and telecommunication networks and basic 
services. The failure was partly due to the shortfall in adequate foreign funding that had 
been hoped for at the end of hostilities and in drafting the various reconstruction plans, 
particularly Horizon 2000.  
Postwar reconstruction plans were delayed, and during 1992-97, only around 60 per 
cent of the planned projects were realized or were in the process of being completed. It 
was not until the end of 2004 that the 1992-97 plans for the physical and productive 
sectors (including airport and ports) were fulfilled. But the social sectors were most 
severely affected by the unrealized plans; only 50 per cent of the original expenditures 
in this sector for the period 1992-97 were achieved by the end of 2004 (Table 4).  
Moreover, allocation of funds between the different sectors for the reconstruction 
programme was, in many respects, far from what was envisaged in the Horizon 2000, 
which had proposed a balanced disbursement of resources among the different sectors 
damaged by the prolonged war. As Table 5 shows, actual allocation during the period 
1992-2004 did not favour the social infrastructure sector.  
Table 5 
Planned versus realized sectoral allocation of reconstruction plans 
Type 1992-97 1992-2004 Horizon 2000 
    
Physical infrastructure, % 52.0 46.3 37 
Social infrastructure,% 13.0 13.1 25 
Public services, % 14.6 25.1 22 
Productive and other (incl. government buildings and ports),%) 20.4 15.5 16 
Source:  Calculations by author from Wetter (1999) and CDR (2005).  
4 Macroeconomic policy and developments, 1992-2002 
Postwar reconstruction in Lebanon was carried out with simultaneous fiscal and 
monetary stabilization efforts that were deemed necessary after the long inflationary 
period from 1984 to 1992. In 1992, government budget deficit was 15 per cent of GDP 
while the inflation rate was 120 per cent. Lebanon was also facing an impending 
balance-of-payments crisis, with a surplus of only US$54 million compared to 
US$1,074 million in 1991 (BdL 1993). To fight inflation and achieve external balance, 
in 1992 the first Hariri government and the central bank used the nominal exchange rate 
as an anchor in the post-1992 stabilization programme in a typical exchange rate-based 
stabilization (ERBS). The ERBS policy was based on a requirement of high foreign 
exchange reserves and discontinuation of the inflationary finance policy that 
characterized government spending in the 1980s. This policy was successful in bringing 
down the inflation that had averaged 110 per cent annually during 1986-92 (BdL 1993) 
to an acceptable 10-12 per cent level by 1995. In contrast, fiscal policy was 
expansionary, because of the demands of reconstruction, the needs of state-building, 
especially the army and security apparata, and social expenditures. The deficit to GDP 
ratio, after an initial drop in 1993, reverted back to its pre-1992 levels.  
 6
Table 6 
Public debt and deficits of postwar Lebanon, 1993-2002 
Year Deficit/GDP, % Debt/GDP, % 
   
1993 9.01 34.4 
1994 19.3 43.5 
1995 15.6 51.3 
1996 18.2 79.9 
1997 23.6 96.6 
1998 14.1 105.4 
1999 14.4 120.0 
2000 23.6 141.0 
2001 16.9 170.0 
2002 16.5 181.0 
  Source:   Dibeh (2005) for the years 1992-2000; calculations by author 
from Audi Bank (2005) for 2001-02. 
Table 7 
GDP, inflation rates and real interest rates in postwar Lebanon 
Year Real GDP growth, % Inflation rate, % Real interest rates, % 
    
1992 4.5 131.0 -105.4 
1993 7.0 24.7 13.3 
1994 8.0 8.0 1.9 
1995 6.5 10.6 4.1 
1996 4.0 8.9 7.6 
1997 3.5 7.7 6.4 
1998 3.0 1.6 9.83 
1999 4.0 1.5 9.38 
2000 2.0 -0.9 11.78 
2001 1.4 2.9 8.0 
2002 1.0 4.2 6.6 
Source: UNCDB (nd) for GDP growth; Eken and Helbling (1999) for inflation rates, 1992-97; Audi Bank 
(2005) for inflation rates, 1998-2002; author calculations for real interest rates (real interest rate 
= 3 months T-bill rate minus inflation).  
 
Table 8 
Foreign direct deposits with the Central Bank of Lebanon 
Year Type 
  
2001 - Deposits solicited by Hariri from Arab 
governments totalling ~ US$1 billion 
- Loan of US$1 billion, of which US$500 million 
went to boost CB reserves 
1997 - Saudi deposit of US$600 million at the CB 
1997 - Kuwaiti deposit of US$100 million at the CB 
Source: Various sources. 
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The expansionary fiscal policy, coupled with the 1993 supply-side tax reforms that 
reduced taxes on profits, salaries, capital incomes among others, led to a growth of the 
country’s public debt to unprecedented levels. The combination of large expenditures 
and low taxes caused a continuous widening of the budget deficit and hence the 
accumulation of further public debt. Given the state’s decision to renounce inflationary 
finance, deficits were financed with the issuance of T-bills denominated in Lebanese 
pounds. Starting in 1998, as the fiscal deficit increased, the government started looking 
for external finance markets through the issuance of what came to be known as 
Eurobonds. This was reflected in a discrete jump in external debt as of 1998. Table 6 
summarizes budget deficits and how public debt has evolved in the postwar period. 
The postwar macroeconomic policy mix led to a sharp increase in nominal and real 
interest rates, having positive effects on the external balance and on the subscription 
rates in T-bills and bonds issued by the Lebanese government. Urnéchlian, Eken and 
Helbling (1999) show that in the context of the ERBS policy, the average annualized 
excess returns on short-term T-bills in the mid 1990s were around 16 per cent. Such 
development, however, had a negative consequence for the real economy. The ERBS 
policy, in conjunction with persistent deficits and growing public debt, led to sluggish 
economic growth and triggered a boom-bust cycle that put an end to the short-lived 
postwar reconstruction boom (Dibeh 2003, 2007). After an initial short-lived postwar 
reconstruction boom, Lebanon faced a period with real GDP growth in 1998-2002 
developing at rates well below the early postwar era. It is noteworthy that the recession 
was accompanied by disinflation and even deflation. Moreover, the recession coincided 
with diminishing credit to the private sector and accelerating credit by the banking 
sector to the public sector. The growth cycle was accompanied by investment and 
consumption cycles that reflected the diffusion and depth of the business cycle 
experienced in this period.   
Starting in 1997, the Lebanese government led by Rafic Hariri sensed the 
unsustainability of the postwar macroeconomic policy. The fiscal crisis, coupled with 
the ERBS policy, was causing high real interest rates, unsustainable deficit and public 
debt growth and economic recession. The growing public debt and economic slowdown 
were tackled with the convening of the donors conference, Friends of Lebanon, in 
Washington in December 1997 when the government proposal included projects valued 
at US$5 billion to be financed over five years through grants and soft loans. Pledges of 
around US$1 billion were made for 1998. But the United States promised to increase its 
funding for Lebanon to merely ‘more than US$20 million’. This ‘foreign leap’ by the 
country in 1997 was to become the main policy-response of successive Hariri 
governments in the face of successive economic challenges and crises.2 Foreign aid via 
donor conferences and direct deposits with the central bank were to become the 
government procedure for resolving the macroeconomic imbalances during this period. 
The direct deposits with the Central Bank of Lebanon occurred at two crucial junctures: 
in 1997 and 2001 (Table 8). During both periods, the central bank was losing reserves 
and the currency came under severe market pressure. The deposits acted to prop up the 
reserves and calm the currency markets and restore confidence in the Lebanese currency 
                                                 
2 Except in the 1998-2000 period when an anti-Hariri government was in power. The government 
devised a reform plan that articulated necessary reform measures, but the programme was never 
implemented.  
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but more importantly also in the ability of the government to mobilize foreign funds at 
times of crises.  
After the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, the government with the 
assistance of the UNDP prepared another US$5 billion plan. Hoping for foreign aid to 
finance the plan, the government appealed to the international community for help in the 
reconstruction of the southern regions. But due to mounting political pressure on the 
Lebanese government from the US and the west to send the army to the south, foreign 
aid was not forthcoming even from seemingly sympathetic Arab countries. As a result 
of the mounting pressure, the US Congress blocked a US$35 million aid package to 
Lebanon in 2001 and Arab Gulf countries allocated only around US$100 million in 
loans and grants. By 2001, the economy was showing signs of a severe strain and a 
possible financial crisis was widely forecasted by many. The internal financing schemes 
for postwar reconstruction as well as the fiscal and monetary policies of the successive 
postwar governments were taking their toll on the economy. Up to this point, the 
political economy in Lebanon with regard to debt financing had been able to prevent 
currency and financial crises. The state/commercial banks nexus provided political-
economic support for stable currency and financial markets. The IMF recognized that 
Lebanon, through balance sheet interconnections between commercial banks and 
government, was able to sustain the high levels of government deficits and the spiralling 
public debt without the collapse of the currency, as had been predicted by many 
observers, including the IMF itself (IMF 2004). However, this state of affairs could not 
be sustained beyond 2002. Continuing pressure on the Lebanese government by both 
the local commercial banks that would bear the brunt of any government default or 
currency collapse and by the IMF was becoming too great. The consultation team at 
IMF for Lebanon called on the country in December 2001 to devalue its currency, 
which was met by widespread objections within both the government circles and the 
commercial banking sector. As a consequence of such adverse economic and political 
developments, the newly formed Hariri government embarked on preparations for 
holding the Paris I meeting in February 2001 which was a preliminary meeting of 
potential international donors. This preparatory meeting led one year later to the 
convening of the Paris II Conference held in November 2002. 
The macroeconomic and stabilization policies, coupled with the foreign aid in its post-
1997 form, also played a role in the deindustrialization process that occurred during the 
postwar period. The ERBS policy and the insatiable need for foreign inflows to finance 
the chronic budget deficits through the banking system have maintained real interest 
rates at high levels throughout the postwar period. Furthermore, commercial credit to 
the private sector stagnated and was crowded-out by the commercial banks supply of 
credit to the public sector. This worked to skew the Lebanese development towards a 
rentier-based economy with Dutch disease effects.3 In Lebanon, the process of 
deindustrialization in the postwar period was significant and unparalleled in an 
economy undergoing postwar reconstruction, when its average annual growth rate for 
industry from 1993 to 2003 was -0.4 per cent and for manufacturing -1.8 per cent per 
annum (World Bank database).  
                                                 
3  The role of foreign aid in engendering Dutch disease effects have been documented in many studies 
(Bulir and Timothy 2002; Vos 1998) 
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5 The economic effects of the Paris II meetings 
The Paris II meetings held in November 2002 were a landmark event in the postwar 
period. The donors conference was attended by many countries and multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. The official goal for convening the 
Paris II Conference was to seek international support for the Lebanese reform 
programme that included a reduction in debt to GDP ratios, budgetary restraint and 
better growth prospects in the medium run (MOF 2003). Even though the government 
paper presented at the Paris II meeting was titled ‘Beyond Reconstruction and Recovery 
Towards Sustainable Growth: A Request for International Support’, the government’s 
immediate aim was to prevent an imminent fiscal and financial crisis. Lebanon asked 
for concessionary loans and grants that would help to pay off a part of its debt, to extend 
debt maturities and to reduce the interest rate on public debt in addition to favourably 
changing the structure of interest rates in the economy as a whole. International lenders 
were forthcoming with concessionary loans, as can be seen in Table 9 with regard to the 
amounts of foreign funds disbursed by the various countries and institutions. 
One of the main interesting features of Paris II was the engagement of the powerful 
internal financial players in Lebanon in the rescue package. The central bank pledged 
US$4.2 billion, and the commercial banks, whose role in the financing of public debt up 
to that point has provided them with windfall profits, also pledged to subscribe to 
US$3.6 billion worth of 2-year T-bills at zero per cent interest. The package received by 
the Lebanese government totalled in all US$10.1 billion. Such an inflow of funds into 
Lebanon and into the state treasury provided the country with opportunities for 
economic growth and macroeconomic adjustment unprecedented in its postwar 
economic history. There were many positive effects of the foreign concessionary loans 
and the matching subscription by the central and commercial banks of Lebanon 
(Table 10 and Figure 1): (i) public debt growth decelerated; (ii) the cost of government 
borrowing both in LP and dollar-denominated debts was significantly reduced; (iii), and 
more importantly from a macroeconomic perspective, market interest rates on both LP 
and dollar-denominated commercial loans went down; (iv) the foreign exchange 
revenues of the Bank of Lebanon increased; and (v) the balance of payments improved 
significantly. As a result, it can be said that the Paris II meetings helped Lebanon avert a 
financial crisis and laid the foundations for economic recovery. 
Table 9 
Foreign loans secured in Paris II meetings 
Country/agency Amount (million) Conditions 
   
Saudi Arabia $700 15 years, 5-year grace period, 5 % interest 
Kuwait $300 same 
UAE $300 same 
Qatar $200 same 
Malaysia $300 same 
Oman $52 same 
France  €500 15 years, 3-year grace period, 5% interest 
EU €12.25 grant 
Arab Monetary Fund $15 Medium-term loan 
Source:  MOF (2003). 
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Table 10 
Interest rates, reserves and balance of payments: before and after Paris II 
  Debt Market interest rate   
 
Cost of  
borrowing 
LP- 
denominated 
$- 
denominated LP US$ 
BdL 
reserves 
Balance of 
payments 
 % % % % % US$ bn US$ bn 
          
Before Paris II         
 11.97 13.82 9.21  16.10 9.62  3.5 0.3  
After Paris II         
 8.36 9.23 7.39  10.48 7.89  10.4 3.3 
Source:  MOF (2003) and BdL database.  
Table 11 
Projected and actual debt-to-GDP ratios (per cent) 
  2003 2004 2005 
     
Projected   136 126 114 
Actual   174 164 160 
Source:  MOF (2003) and Audi (2005). 
Figure 1 
Economic growth and interest rates in post-Paris II period 
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Source:  MOF (2003). 
Despite these positive effects of the Paris II meetings on the state of government 
finances and on money markets, they failed to make a lasting impact on one of the most 
worrying trends in the Lebanese postwar economy: the growing debt to GDP ratio. 
Table 11 shows the difference between the projected (according to the government Paris 
II paper) and actual debt-to-GDP ratios in the post-Paris II period.  
Moreover, in the post-Paris II meetings, the Lebanese government failed to implement 
the promised structural reforms such as administrative reform, fiscal restraint and 
privatization that had been put forth in its paper to the conference. This failure can be 
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attributed to the negative impact on the fiscal and reform response of successive 
Lebanese governments as a result of foreign aid aimed at short-run stabilization needs. 
In general, starting in 1997, the shift in the purpose of foreign aid was a disincentive for 
fiscal and economic reforms by successive postwar governments.4  
6 Conclusion 
This paper has shown that foreign aid in postwar Lebanon passed through two phases 
with distinct features that have had far-reaching implications for postwar development. 
In the first phase, lasting from 1992 to 1997, foreign aid was mainly channelled towards 
providing resources for postwar reconstruction projects. The second phase from 1997 to 
the present witnessed a qualitative shift in foreign aid utilization from the needs of 
reconstruction towards financial the needs of stability and balance-of-payments 
equilibrium. This shift allowed the government to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, maintained balance-of-payments surpluses during this period, reduced interest 
rates on public debt instruments and finally provided the liquidity and ‘confidence’ 
necessary for the government to continue borrowing funds from local commercial banks 
and foreign investors. More importantly, this shift in foreign aid allowed the 
government to avoid financial and currency crises in 2002.  
The experience of postwar Lebanon has shown that the macroeconomic policy mix is a 
crucial element in postwar reconstruction and economic development. Macroeconomic 
imbalances can push governments to sideline reconstruction programmes. Such needs 
and programmes in Lebanon were all but forgotten by 1997 with the mounting 
macroeconomic pressures. The government shifted its priorities from reconstruction 
despite the country’s lagging economy in terms of reconstruction success indicators 
such as economic growth, GDP per capita and capital accumulation in comparison to 
other postwar economies. For example, in the Paris II meetings, the US$1.3 billion 
pledged for ‘socioeconomic development’ never materialized nor did the Lebanese 
government make an attempt to secure the funds by providing a list of potential 
projects. During and after the meetings the government effort was put overwhelmingly 
towards securing loans for public debt restructuring.  
The current state of economic crisis in Lebanon that intensified in the aftermath of the 
July 2006 Israel-Lebanon war pushed the government to call for the holding of the 
international donors conference that had initially been planned to be held in Beirut. The 
conference (Paris III) was finally held in Paris in January 2007, and raised around 
US$7.6 billion of pledges in soft loans and grants in support of the Lebanese 
government economic and fiscal reform programmes. The conference was seen as a 
sequel for the Paris II meetings. The political blame on the failure of the Paris II 
meetings was put on the president of the republic and on the pro-Syrian political parties. 
However, the international community, including the IMF and the United States, has 
implicitly blamed the whole political system in Lebanon for the non-implementation of 
the reforms promised at the Paris II meetings. In early 2006, the United Sates, through 
its ambassador in Lebanon, called for the country to undergo supervision by the IMF for 
                                                 
4 Such behavioural effect of donor aid on the fiscal stance of governments in the developing world and 
in post-conflict societies has been studied by McGillivray and Morrissey (2004). 
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any funds to be disbursed at future donors meetings. In April 2007, the IMF and 
Lebanon signed a US$76.8 million loan agreement under the Emergency Post-Conflict 
Assistance Programme. The IMF will monitor developments in 2007 regarding the 
implementation of the reform plan, and the donor countries will take into consideration 
these reports in their final decision to disperse funds pledged at Paris III. Moreover, the 
IMF and Lebanon are expected to sign a larger loan agreement next year under an IMF 
stand-by arrangement. Such agreement would impose some form of IMF conditionality 
on Lebanon. The dependency on foreign aid for stabilization purposes has led Lebanon 
to become a candidate for IMF conditionality which, if realized, will have negative 
effects on income distribution and poverty. 
Apart from the specific conditionality enforcement and accountability mechanisms that 
will be developed, Paris III meeting should be seen as an opportunity for Lebanon to 
embark on the path of sustainable development. This sustainable development must be a 
new phase in the postwar economy of Lebanon that makes a break with the past with 
regard to the country’s dependence on foreign loans and aid for reconstruction and 
macroeconomic stability.  
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